Option prices contain forward looking information about stock price volatility and, potentially, the probability of bankruptcy. We develop a risk-neutral density (RND) model consisting of a mixture of two lognormal densities with a probability of bankruptcy. We calibrate this model to daily stock and option prices of six financial institutions during the onset of the financial crisis to see what information about bankruptcy probabilities can be inferred from option prices. The bankruptcy probability and the shape of the RND for the institutions are examined, particularly on major event dates. The empirical results show that acquiring banks have a lower bankruptcy probability than the acquired banks; RNDs of financial institutions reflect market shocks, especially in fat tails and bankruptcy probability.
Introduction
During the recent financial crisis commencing in 2007, the market has been heavily affected by a credit crisis. The main cause for this was the increase in popularity of securitized products, leading to cheap credit and low lending standards.
1 Then, the increase in subprime mortgage defaults induced a liquidity crisis which resulted in the collapse of certain large financial institutions.
It is interesting to observe how markets reacted to changes in the financial environment. In particular, whether predictions of the impending crisis could be observed in contemporaneous market prices. In this research, we use options data to generate market expectations of future risk-neutral densities of stock prices to investigate whether the effects of news announcements and economic events are reflected in the stock or option prices of financial institutions involved in the financial crisis.
As options prices embed future predictions of stock price densities, it is possible that some information about the banking crisis could have been revealed sooner in the options markets, rather than in the equity markets. In particular, it might be possible to infer the probability of future bankruptcy from options data. We analyse the forced mergers between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns on 13 March 2008, and between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch on 15
September 2008. We also analyse the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near failure of AIG on 15 September 2008. The institutions acquired were relatively fragile, and we find that the acquired banks had a higher probability of bankruptcy. We also observe how risk-neutral densities reflect the major events of financial institutions. In this paper we also research the relationship between implied bankruptcy chances and the characteristics of financial institutions. We find that small volatile firms, with low returns, have a higher chance of bankruptcy than large stable firms with high returns.
1 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010) argue that securitization changes illiquid loans into liquid securities and decreases the incentives of financial intermediaries to screen and monitor borrowers for increasing distance between a loan's originator and a bearer of the loan' default risk (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . The empirical results of Keys et al. (2010) show that increased securitization led to a decline in credit quality.
After the Internet bubble burst in 2000, the Federal Reserve Bank adopted a lax interest rate policy. The low interest rate environment accompanied by capital inflows from abroad led to a high level of monetary supply. At the same time, the banking system created and sold securitized loans and corporate bonds. The banking model facilitated the supply of capital and resulted in a housing bubble. The increase in the issuing of securitized products finally led to a lot of cheap credit and low lending standards. Then, in 2007, an increase in subprime mortgage defaults triggered a liquidity crisis. The downgrading of mortgage-backed securities made the lending market even worse. In interbank funding markets, banks became unwilling to provide liquidity to other banks. The resultant liquidity dry-ups, market declines and defaults led to the financial crisis (Allen and Carletti, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009 had been sold to Bank of America. In related literature, the "forced merger" between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns was considered by Allen and Carletti (2008) and Rhee (2010) . The US government feared that the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns would cascade through the financial system and lead to a string of bankruptcies. The government forced relatively sound banks to merge with risky banks in order to stabilize the financial crisis and protect the public interest.
There has been fruitful research into bank mergers. Previous research on mergers has focused on changes in market values, costs and revenues, and managerial efficiency (Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo, 2002; Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 2004) . It is worth paying attention to how forced mergers affect the risks of the institutions involved. Generally, however, in the fields of default forecasting or bankruptcy forecasting, financial institutions are excluded (Shumway, 2001; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Bharath and Shumway, 2008) .
2
Unlike previous research, we compare the daily probability of bankruptcy for financial institutions during the financial crisis, especially before and after the announcement of forced mergers. In this paper, both the forced merger between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns and that between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch are considered. It is interesting to observe whether the acquiring banks have lower bankruptcy probability than the acquired banks. Also, the paper includes the American International Group (AIG) and Lehman Brothers cases. We anticipate finding that the probability of bankruptcy increases when a bank is strongly expected not to survive, e.g. to be acquired or announce bankruptcy in the near future.
In the default probabilities and bankruptcy estimation field, various kinds of historical data have been considered. Accounting variables, such as the ratios of working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, market equity to total liabilities, and sales to total asset, were used by Altman (1968) . Zmijewski (1984) considered the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Also, sheet data and debt information are considered by Amel-Zadeh (2011) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) .
Camara, Popova and Simkins (2011) compared agency credit ratings with their model's results. Fabozzi, Chen, Hu and Pan (2010) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) used stock prices. Shumway (1999) found that half of accounting ratios are poor predictors, while market driven variables are strongly related to the probability of bankruptcy. He found that larger less volatile firms with high past returns had lower risk of bankruptcy. However, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) found that market-based models are not superior to accounting-ratio-based model.
Options prices have not previously been used to directly infer bankruptcy probability. 3 There are two advantages to using options data. Options prices are considered a forward-looking measure. Options prices reflect aggregate risk-neutral market expectations for the underlying stock price until maturity of the contract. These data carry high information efficiency.
Option-implied volatilities and densities have strong forecasting ability, especially when the forecast horizon is either one month or three months (Poon and Granger, 2003; Pong, Shackleton, Taylor and Xu, 2004; Liu, Shackleton, Taylor and Xu, 2007; Shackleton, Taylor and Yu, 2010) .
In this paper, we estimate the daily risk-neutral density of financial institutions during the financial crisis and observe how it reacts to major events. There are various methods to estimate risk-neutral densities. For example, the Quadratic implied volatility method is a simple and efficient way to estimate risk-neutral density. Malz (1997a Malz ( , 1997b proposed estimating the implied volatility curve as a quadratic function of the Black-Scholes options' delta and the method has been applied to equity market by Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002) , Liu, Shackleton, Taylor and Xu (2007) , and Taylor, Yadav and Zhang (2009) .
Previous research has shown the advantages of mixture of lognormal densities. Melick and Thomas (1997) developed a method for estimating the probability density function for crude oil futures prices from American options prices. They found that a mixture of lognormal distributions characterized market information better than a single lognormal assumption. Jondeau and Rockinger (2000) compared the quality of risk-neutral densities estimated from various models. They found that a method based on a mixture of lognormal densities provides a better fit to options prices with short-term maturity than other methods based on either a Hermite approximation or a jump-diffusion process. Liu, Shackleton, Taylor and Xu (2007) showed the mixture density provide a better fit than the Malz method. Therefore, a mixed lognormal with possible bankruptcy is considered in this paper.
To forecast default probability, Camara, Popova and Simkins (2011) assume risk-neutral densities (RNDs) are composed of a single lognormal density augmented with a probability of bankruptcy. To avoid the rigid shape of the lognormal density, we consider mixing two lognormal densities augmented with a positive probability of bankruptcy. We find that this amendment causes the density shape to describe investors' expectations well. (Brunnermeier, 2009) . As AIG plays an important role in the US financial market, the US government provided bailouts to save it and to stabilize the financial market. In the end, it survived the financial crisis. The major events of these institutions are summarized in Table 1. 3 Data Table 2 . Daily end-of-day settlement options prices are obtained for these periods from OptionMetrics.
Volatility expectations implied by the option prices are compared with daily realized volatilities calculated from two-minute returns, obtained from prices in the TAQ database.
The realized variance for day t is the sum of squares of two-minute returns:
σ from which the annualized realized volatility for day t is calculated as t σ252 .
The option contracts are American. We concentrate our analysis on short-term, out-of-themoney (OTM) option contracts for which the early exercise premia can be ignored. Call and put prices for contracts with the same strike and expiry contain the same information, so that ignoring in-the-money (ITM) prices does not lose information when matching calls and puts are traded. A second advantage of OTM options is that they are more actively traded than ITM options.
To simplify equations and calculations, the option contracts are assumed to be European and written on synthetic futures contracts, with futures and options always having matching expiry times. As is well-known, the synthetic futures price F depends on the spot price S, the risk-free rate r and the present value of dividends during the time T until the futures contract expires:
(
The term r is calculated from a zero coupon yield curve in WRDS by linear interpolation.
Option prices for five strike prices and a common expiry date are required to estimate the most general specification of the risk-neutral density considered in this paper. For any day and firm, whenever option prices for calls and puts are available for five OTM strikes we use all of the OTM option prices; for a strike X, calls are defined to be OTM when F X > and puts are OTM when F X < . The second nearest-to-maturity options are chosen whenever they provide five or more OTM option prices. Table 3 reports that this is possible for between 67% (BAC) and 86% (LEH) of the days in our sample.
When there are less than five available strikes for the second nearest contracts, we switch to the third nearest-to-maturity contracts if possible. When there are also less than five available strike prices for these contracts, we delete the sample day. In a few cases, there are sufficient strikes for the second or third nearest contracts but the sum of squared pricing errors, described in Section 4, is very high and more than ten times the standard deviation for the firm; we then use the nearest time-to-maturity, providing it has five available strikes and, furthermore, there are no dividend payments before the nearest expiry date. Table 3 shows that the nearest options are used for less than 5% of sample days, while the frequency for the third-nearest options varies from 12% (LEH) to 31% (BAC).
There are a small number of cases when we can only obtain five or more available strikes by including ITM puts. This has been done for 16 days for AIG, four days for BAC, and one day each for BSC and MER. These cases occur when the spot price is low and there is either zero or one available OTM put.
We have a satisfactory number of strikes for all days in our sample periods for JPM, LEH and MER. Table 3 reports that 3% of the days are discarded for BAC, 15% for BSC and 26% for AIG.
Methodology

Distributions
Many methods can be used to estimate risk-neutral densities from option prices, including several reviewed in Taylor (2005) . One of the most popular density specifications is a mixture of two lognormal densities, first proposed by Ritchey (1990) and applied in numerous studies including Melick and Thomas (1997) , Brigo and Mercurio (2002) and Liu et al (2007) . The mixture of lognormals (MLN) density has three more parameters than the lognormal (LN) density, which permits a variety of flexible shapes for the risk-neutral density (RND). It also offers the possibility of interpreting the RND as the density of a process having two possible futures states.
The MLN density for time T assumes the underlying asset price will always be positive when options expire T years after the present time. We generalise the distribution of the future spot price to allow for bankruptcy, which is here identified with the event 0 = T S
. We allocate weights 1 π and 2 π to two lognormal distributions and the remaining weight,
, to the probability of bankruptcy. The risk-neutral, cumulative distribution function of T S is (2) with parameters ). , , , , , (
The component lognormal distributions have expectations 1 F and 2 F , and the cumulative functions are given by 
, ( 2 (5) and with (.) φ the density of the standard normal distribution. 
As the general distribution defined by (2) combines MLN and bankruptcy features we refer to (2) by using the acronym MLNbk. The MLNbk distribution has six parameters restricted by one equality constraint, so there are five free parameters. We claim later that MLNbk describes our option prices better than the following three special cases: (1) Therefore, when the underlying asset price on the expiry date has a MLNbk distribution, the theoretical price of a call option is given by:
as call options are worthless if the firm is bankrupt. Put options are worth X if the firm is bankrupt, so their theoretical prices for the MLNbk distribution are:
Parameter estimation
All parameters are estimated by minimizing the average of the squared differences between traded prices for OTM options and the corresponding theoretical OTM prices. For a set of traded strikes n X X ,..., 1 , and OTM prices )
A summary of the parameter estimates obtained from the option prices included in our study is provided by Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 summarises the values of G across the sample periods.
As the distributions of the G-values are positively skewed, we state results for both means and medians. The LNbk distribution has two states (survive, with a lognormal distribution, or go bankrupt) and it fits the option prices more accurately than a single lognormal distribution.
The median G for LNbk divided by the median G for LN varies from 11% to 27% across institutions; the ratio of means varies from 16% to 34%. However, the LNbk distribution is simply a limiting case of the MLN distribution, which allows for two general states. When we compare G-values for LNbk and MLN we find the more general distribution has median values which are between 6% and 10% of the median values for the special case; the ratios are 8% to 12% for mean values. The MLNbk distribution is our most general specification and its values of G are a notable improvement upon all special cases. The MLNbk distribution has medians which are between 19% and 37% of the MLN medians, with mean ratios from 24% to 55%. Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the estimated parameters for the MLNbk distribution. As is typical in the MLN literature for equity markets, the lower-expectation state is less likely but more volatile, i.e. when varying from 1.2% for BSC to 4.5% for AIG.
Empirical results
We first compare the probability of bankruptcy for the six financial institutions, contrasting the chances for acquiring, acquired, bankrupt and bailed-out institutions. Next, we provide separate case studies for each institution, and discuss changes in bankruptcy perceptions and risk-neutral densities especially when major relevant news items are announced. Finally, we report the results of regressing time series of bankruptcy probabilities on firm-specific factors. The probability of bankruptcy for the acquired banks, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, is shown in Figure 2 . The respective probabilities on the acquisition dates are 27% (BSC, March 17) and 11% (MER, September 15); these are end-of-day probabilities, calculated after the announcements. The average probability of bankruptcy for the acquiring banks, calculated across the month prior to acquisition, is compared with that of the acquired banks in Table 5 . The acquiring institutions have lower averages, of 0.7% (JPM) and 0.9% (BAC), than those of the acquired institutions, which are 3.1% (BSC) and 2.3% (MER). These results are consistent with the market implying a higher chance of failure for the acquired institutions, reflecting beliefs that they are more fragile than the relatively sound acquirers.
Comparison of the probability of bankruptcy across institutions
Figure 2 also shows that the only bankrupt institution in our sample, Lehman Brothers, had the highest implied probabilities, which went as high as 54% on September 15, 2008; again this is a post-announcement probability. Figure 2 also shows that American International
Group had high probabilities for several months after the Lehman bankruptcy.
We now consider the financial institutions in detail and first discuss the two which were seriously involved in the March 2008 crisis, namely Bear Stearns and JP Morgan. Figure 3 shows that BSC had a bankruptcy chance below 2% before Monday March 10. As liquidity dried up, the probability increased reflecting rising fear among investors. On
Bear Stearns (BSC)
Monday March 17, JP Morgan offered to acquire Bear Stearns at a low price when the implied probability of bankruptcy was 27%. 
JP Morgan (JPM)
The market implied estimates of future bankruptcy are generally lower for JP Morgan than the other five institutions. Figures 1 to 3 show JPM is the only institution whose maximum bankruptcy probability is below 10%. The probability is below 2% until the crisis events of
September 2008 and then increases, with most values between 2% and 4% until March 2009
and then the values fall below 1%.
As already discussed, Bear Stearns was acquired by the relatively stable JPM in March 2008.
The estimated bankruptcy risk for JPM increased, temporarily, on March 17 to 2%. However, Figure 5 shows that on this day the risk-neutral distribution has low probabilities for future low prices. From Figure 5 , the densities for four later days, discussed below, also confirm that JPM was perceived to be "relatively strong" between August 2008 and June 2009.
On August 12, JP Morgan Chase reported a $1.5 billion write-down in July. JPM said that trading conditions in the mortgage market had seriously deteriorated in July due to cut-price sales of mortgage-backed securities; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been less willing to support the market (Lucas and Torregrosa, 2010 
Lehman Brothers (LEH)
Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the options market implied that Lehman Brothers was unsafe from mid-March 2008 until it went bankrupt six months later. Before the Bear Stearns crisis the bankruptcy risk was less than 1%, but it peaked at 9% on March 17 when Bear Stearns was rescued. Subsequently, the estimated risk fell for two months before rising again, reaching 19% on 11 September and then 54% on September 15 when LEH announced bankruptcy.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows three measures of annualised volatility which all soar around March 17 and September 15; these measures are the realised volatility (RV), the conditional standard deviation from the GJR-ARCH model calculated from daily returns and the standard deviation of the MLN risk-neutral density.
We now discuss some of the major events for Lehman Brothers in 2008. On January 17, having already lost 2,500 jobs, LEH announced plans to cut a further 1,300 jobs in its domestic mortgage division. At this time LEH did not have known liquidity issues, the estimated bankruptcy chance was less than 1% and the estimated risk-neutral densities, shown in Figure 7 , do not reveal any market concerns. During March, however, LEH relied on overnight Fed funding to survive during the Bear Stearns crisis period. The bankruptcy rate reached 9% on March 17, when Figure 7 shows bimodal densities for the stock price one month later. One mode is at a few dollars while the other mode is above $40, so the information provided by the densities is evidence of major concern that LEH may collapse.
On August 20, Lehman Brothers held secret talks to sell the majority of its shares to the Korea Development Bank. On Tuesday September 9, as it became clear the deal would fail, the LEH share price plunged. The estimated bankruptcy chance shot up to 18%, reflecting the negative news. On Thursday September 11, Lehman Brothers announced plans to contract as a way to survive the credit crisis. This news came after LEH reported its worst ever loss of $3.9 billion for the third quarter, spurred by $7.8 billion in credit-related write-downs. viii The bankruptcy risk remained at a high level, 19%, and Figure 7 now shows very low share price expectations.
In an effort to save LEH, the Federal Reserve Bank held meetings with representatives of all the major banks. On Sunday September 14, Bank of America, lacking a government guarantee, withdrew from bidding for Lehman Brothers. The next morning, on Monday September 15, Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy. For this day, and following the announcement, the realized volatility and bankruptcy chance rose to extremely high levels, respectively 1,058% and 54%.
Merrill Lynch (MER)
Comparing Figure Before the Bear Stearns crisis, the MEL bankruptcy chance was less than 1%. This occurred despite the announcement on January 17 of a net loss of $7.8 billion, which included a $14.1 billion write-down on investments related to sub-prime mortgages. ix The risk of bankruptcy then remained at a low level, 0.3%.
Later, on July 28, Merrill Lynch announced a $8.5 billion share offer and a $5.7 billion fire sale of toxic mortgage securities.
x The share return on this day was -12% and the probability of bankruptcy increased to 2.3%.
On Sunday September 14, as its competitor Lehman Brothers was sinking, Merrill Lynch "reading the signs … announced … that it had sold itself to Bank of America for $50 billion" (Brunnermeier, 2007) . This price was equivalent to $29 per share, which was 70% higher than Merrill's most recent traded stock price. The realized volatility and bankruptcy chance on Monday September 15 were 172% and 11% respectively. The relatively high probability of future bankruptcy on this and subsequent days may reflect a lack of confidence either in the sale of MEL or in the strength of its rescuer. Figure 9 shows the estimated risk-neutral densities on September 15 are highly skewed to the left, with expectations far below $29.
Bank of America (BAC)
As shown by Figures 1 and 8 , the market considered Bank of America to be relatively safe during the crises of March and September 2008, but less safe after these crises. The estimated probability of bankruptcy is 2% on September 15 and it is lower before then. There are several estimates around 5% later in 2008. These are followed by some estimates above 10%
during the first half of 2009 and by much lower values later in the year. The five examples of BAC risk-neutral densities on Figure 9 show expectations falling as time progresses, because the share price falls, but they do not show high chances of very low prices in the future.
On Saturday September 13, Bank of America was seen as the leading contender to buy Lehman Brothers, but the US government was reluctant to provide public backing for a takeover. xi On Sunday September 14, Bank of America instead agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch.
xii The inferred probability of bankruptcy for BAC on Monday September 15 increased, but only to 2.1%, which reflects some level of systemic credit risk following the LEH bankruptcy.
On October 7, Bank of America reported its third quarter earnings which were less than analysts' expectations. BAC said it would raise $10 billion of capital and cut its dividend in order to get through the credit crisis. xiii The immediate response to the negative news was a one-day return of -30%.
On October 14, the US government injected $250 billion into the US banking system. As part of their plan, BAC was to get $25 billion in government funds. In return, the government would take an equity position in the bank. xiv While the one-day return was 15%, the probability of bankruptcy went to 3.3%. Thus market concerns about another bankruptcy
were not eliminated by the injection announcement.
On Saturday December 20, S&P downgraded the ratings of six major US banks reflecting anxieties that financial crisis could be longer and deeper than previously expected. Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch raised concerns, because MEL could generate more write-downs in commercial real estate and leveraged loans. xv On Monday December 22, the bankruptcy estimate was 1.9%.
On January 15, 2009, BAC received a $138 billion bailout. The bailout was to be used to improve the balance sheet at the newly acquired MEL and to guarantee potential losses on 'toxic assets'. xvi The BAC share price fell 20% on the day and the estimated probability of bankruptcy climbed to a new high level, of 12%. This clearly shows that market concerns were not alleviated by the bailout announcement.
By May the bankruptcy estimates were falling. Nevertheless, on May 7, stress test results exposed Bank of America's lack of capital to survive worst-case scenarios. The bankruptcy estimate was then 2.3%, compared with 0.6% for JP Morgan which was reported to be adequately capitalized. On May 20, BAC sold shares to raise $13.5 billion, which represented considerable progress towards meeting its capital-raising requirement. On June 3, US banks sold common shares and non-guaranteed debt to raise more money than required by regulators. Mutual funds and other large institutional investors bought shares aggressively and stock prices reflected the improving situation. BAC shares went up by 263% from March's low point, while JPM was up 118%. xvii With the improvement in liquidity conditions, the realized volatility and bankruptcy estimate decreased to 40% and 0.4%, respectively. The market gradually reverted to more normal conditions and the bankruptcy estimate was close to zero after August 2009.
American International Group (AIG)
As can Despite the deal, all the major rating agencies downgraded AIG's long-term credit rating to reflect its losses from mortgage-related investments and credit derivatives. xviii Its share price reflected the shock of the credit downgrades and the dramatic news about LEH and MER.
The daily return (change in the price logarithm) from Friday's close to Monday's close was -93%. Panic is also shown by the very high realized volatility of 828%, and the bankruptcy risk estimate of 12%. The high volatility can be seen in Figure 11 which shows the fat tails of the risk neutral densities on September 12 and 15.
On September xxiii After two weeks, the bankruptcy risk for AIG gradually decreased and stayed at a low level.
Bankruptcy risk and Institutional Characteristics
We run separate regressions for each institution to analyse the relationship between bankruptcy and various firm-specific factors. The multivariate regression is as follows:
r BC (11) where t indexes the date of observation. The independent variables are the continuous return of the institution, t r , the realized volatility of the institution, t RV , and the stock price as the size of the institution, t S . The stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares is used as a proxy of firm size.
Comparing the results across various institutions, shown in in Table 6 , there is not much variation in the sign or significance of the explanatory variables. Generally, the sizes and returns are related negatively to the risk of bankruptcy, while the realized volatility is positively related to it. This suggests that the small volatile firms with low returns have a higher bankruptcy rate than large stable firms with high returns. This is consistent with previous research (Shumway, 2001 ).
The 2 R values range from 41% to 79%. There remains variation in the probability of bankruptcy not explained by the three variables. Therefore, there is some information about implied bankruptcy risk that is not explained by the three variables, size, returns and realized volatility, during the financial crisis period.
Conclusions
We have developed a risk-neutral density model which uses options prices and estimates the chance of bankruptcy under a risk-neutral measure. The MLNbk model extracts RNDs more accurately, especially when the density depends on three future states. The density shows the market expectation of stock prices over the life of options. Our model provides forwardlooking information extracted from options prices.
As expected, we find a higher chance of bankruptcy for the acquired bank than for the acquiring bank in the forced merger case. The MLNbk model is useful in providing a measure of the forward-looking bankruptcy risk which can be applied to other areas in risk rating systems, capital structures, financial markets and policy decisions, among others.
Further research can compare the implied bankruptcy chance to market-based default variables, such as credit default swaps and the yield spread of corporate bonds (Bharath and Shumway, 2008) .
We also find that small volatile firms with low returns have a higher bankruptcy risk than large stable firms with high returns. This is consistent with Shumway's (2001) research. The sample periods are listed in Table 2 . The summary statistics are for the quantity G defined by (9) . N is the number of option prices used to estimate the parameters of the distributions. The sample periods are listed in Table 2 . where the integers i and t respectively refer to the financial institution and the date. The sample periods are listed in Table 2 .
An asterisk * indicates a significant estimate at a 5% level. 
